victory; the image of the future that O'Brien presents to Winston is of a boot stamping on a human face-forever (220), an image borrowed from London's The Iron Heel.
If we disregard, for a moment, the particular content of the activity O'Brien is involved in and concentrate instead on its form, we find that the rejection of instrumentality-that is, of activities pursued as means to an end-is an important feature of utopian fiction. William Morris, for example, in his News from Nowhere (1890), depicts a simple society that has voluntarily rejected many of the questionable gains of technology for the sake of creativity and pleasure in work. This ideal is close to the Marxist one of the creative, nonalienated person, and it implies freedom from the realm of necessity. Even utopias that do not envision such an achievement seem to share in the ideal, as we can see from their goal of an ever-decreasing workday that allows the cultivation of leisure. The more that human beings are freed from the realm of necessity, the closer they can approach the ideal of an intrinsically valuable existence.2
In other words, play and not work characterizes the good life, but to understand this idea we need to go beyond the common view of play as an escape from or a compensation for the rigors of daily life, or of leisure time as the mere period of recovery that it becomes when labor predominates in life. One of the most fundamental features of games, as virtually all students of play agree, is gratuitousness or immanence. Games are ends in themselves. They are not means to further ends (except in certain ambiguous situations in which some basic divisions are contravened-as, for example, in professional sports). One of the simplest and clearest ways to envision the lack of instrumentality in games is to focus on the constraints imposed by play-the rules of the game, in other words. Consider basketball: if the purpose of the game were merely to put balls through baskets, a ladder could be brought in or the basket could be lowered or made much larger. Clearly, the voluntarily accepted rules of the game impose difficulties or obstacles that are essential to its pursuit. The aim-to make baskets-is thus not sufficient to define this activity as play. This end can be pursued only within the framework of certain constraints that constitute the game; accepting this framework is what playing the game means. Similarly, if someone throws a ball into the basket to dislodge a knife that might fall and injure a player during the game, this act cannot properly be viewed as playing the game. The game is an activity that is intrinsically valuable and that is pursued for its own sake. But to say that games are gratuitous is not at all to say that they are without meaning. Much can be learned about a society through the study of its games, and the games played in 1984 are no exception.
Not all forms of play, of course, depend on contest or competition, as Roger Caillois shows in extending Huizinga's conception of play. In addition to contest or competition, which he calls agon, Caillois introduces three other categories of play: chance (alea), simulation (mimicry), and vertigo (ilinx). In 1984 all four categories of play appear, but it is above all the competitive game of power that is pursued. When power is pursued for its own sake, it becomes a game, and clearly it must be a competitive game, for, far from being an absolute or independent abstraction, power always consists in a relation. In other words, the obstacle or difficulty that makes the game of power possible is another human consciousness. But not just any other consciousness, and especially not a weak one. A weak opponent in the game of power produces the same unsatisfactory victory as a weak opponent in a game of chess: for the game to be relished, a relative equality between the players is needed. This requirement explains a great deal about O'Brien's relationship to Winston Smith.
The game analogy provides a model that helps us understand the interactions within 1984, but in no way should it detract from the utter seriousness with which we should view the world Orwell projects in this novel. We need first of all to free ourselves of the conventional opposition between the realm of play and the serious concerns of "real" life (see Ehrmann) . Games can be serious-deadly serious-as the game-playing aspects of military com-bat and political machinations make abundantly clear, and as Orwell's comments on sports also reveal. In "The Sporting Spirit," an essay written in 1945, Orwell comments on the orgies of hatred generated by international sporting contests and discusses the competitive spirit in the sports that had grown most popular. Orwell links this emphasis to the rise of nationalism, which he characterizes as "the lunatic modern habit of identifying oneself with large power units and seeing everything in terms of competitive prestige." When strong feelings of rivalry are aroused, Orwell says: the notion of playing the game according to the rules always vanishes. People want to see one side on top and the other side humiliated and they forget that victory gained through cheating or through the intervention of the crowd is meaningless. ... Serious sport has nothing to do with fair play. It is bound up with hatred, jealousy, boastfulness, disregard of all rules and sadistic pleasure in witnessing violence; in other words it is war minus the shooting.
( fitting, given their total lack of control over their fate, that the Party allots to them a game of chance, that is, a game that reaffirms the arbitrariness of life and the proles' lack of power. But the games pursued by the Inner Party must be more complex, for they must forever reaffirm the power of Big Brother. The eternal wars among Oceania, Eastasia, and Eurasia, with constantly shifting alliances that have no fundamental effect on the wars, are clearly depicted as games-as activities engaged in for their own sake, without hope of resolution. The three world powers want only to prolong the game, not to arrive at an endpoint. At the same time, however, these wars, which define so much of life in 1984, serve a social purpose, as Goldstein's book explains. The wars are fought both to use up surplus production in a socially useless way-that is, without raising the standard of living-and to justify the eternal need for an elite group that must bear the burden of conducting the war. There are, then, reasons for the war, but these do not negate its gamelike character. All is process; the wars will presumably go on forever. But precisely because the wars serve an ulterior purpose-because they seem to justify the Party's rule-they are not occasions for the absolutely free exercise of power. In addition, they are far-off and in some sense abstract, hence they cannot provide the immediate boot-in-the-face thrill of power that the Party seeks.
With every aspect of life controlled, at least for the 121/2% of the population who are Outer Party members and who make up the group from which dissidents might arise (the proles, of course, do not count; they are so insignificant that they can be left more or less alone as they struggle to eke out an existence), the Party may in fact find itself frustrated in its exercise of power. The constant routine arrests of quickly terrorized or already converted people must be a starvation diet for those whose reason for living is their dominance over others. It would seem that, while the Party has an ever-increasing need for strong new opponents, who alone permit the full enjoyment of power, the Party's total control of life makes such victims harder and harder to find.
A similar contradiction at the very heart of the Party's policies relates to the development of newspeak. When the world of 1984 has evolved further, when newspeak is perfected-as Syme, who is working on the definitive newspeak dictionary, explains-thought crime will literally be impossible and there will be no thought at all in our sense of the word (44-46). When this comes about, will the Party feel its power? Or its powerlessness? The latter is the more likely outcome, for power requires the contrast, something pulling against it, an obstacle to be overcome. A further significant contrast between We and 1984 is that in Zamiatin's novel the protagonist is genuinely seduced into rebellious acts by a woman who leads an opposition group. In 1984, however, it is not Julia who is responsible for such a seduction but rather O'Brien. Winston sees his sexual relationship with Julia, which she initiates, as a political act, a blow against the Party. It is thus made to serve a political purpose-or, in other terms, it is corrupted by the Party's all-pervasive control. Julia, in contrast to Winston, seeks sexual encounters purely for pleasure. Orwell's handling of the interaction between the two men illustrates what Fredric Jameson has called the "ideological double standard." Jameson applies this term to adventure stories that allow the reader vicariously to experience and satisfy a taste for violence, while they ostensibly criticize such violence on political and social grounds (182). The term can be extended to cover situations in which a value system is in fact derived from the very values that are being criticized. In 1984 we find instances of both these aspects of an ideological double standard, but, perhaps because the torture scenes are not always convincing, it is the implicit adherence to a value system the book ostensibly criticizes that is the more pernicious. Curiously, Orwell was perfectly aware of this potential in literature, as his comments on Galsworthy's Forsyte Saga reveal: "Well, the thing that strikes one about Galsworthy is that though he's trying to be iconoclastic, he has been utterly unable to move his mind outside the wealthy bourgeois society he is attacking. Only in a culture that habitually disparages the female and accepts the male as the model for the human being could it ever have gone unremarked that 1984 is above all the story of two men's interactions and that Julia, who is not a participant in the game of domination, presents an alternative mode of behavior. Essentially anarchical, she does not seek to dominate;7 she does not take the Two Minutes Hate seriously (although Winston gets caught up in it); she falls asleep while Winston reads to her from Goldstein's book. Her aim is to get as much genuine pleasure as she can out of the oppressive world in which she finds herself. Given the constraints the novel presents, this approach begins to look positive; certainly Julia's pleasure seeking harms no one, and she is willing to undergo considerable risk for it. Orwell never seems conscious of the strongly masculine narrative voice evident in so much of his writing; similarly, he does not seem aware that his indictment of human behavior is in fact an indictment of male behavior. Gamesmanship is the epitome of male behavior, for it involves domination pursued for its own sake, not for any practical or material objective. Orwell could not name the ideology of which his own views were a part, but his novel has much to contribute as an allegory of hypertrophied masculinity. Because of his habitual disparagement of the female and his acceptance of a male model of behavior, Orwell could not analyze the dynamics of the pursuit of power. Although he called into question many social, political, and economic conventions, he ultimately despaired because he accepted learned male behavior as the human norm. We should clearly recognize that his novel is no indictment of how human beings behave but only of how men in a particular tradition behave. No novel with female protagonists could ever have been so readily accepted as describing the generally human, but the identification of the male with the human norm is among the conventions of a male-dominated society that is only now being seriously challenged.9
Orwell's despair is a sign of his moral sensibility, of his awareness that the (androcentric) values of his time presented a great danger to humanity, and we can respect the clarity with which he drew his conclusions about the culture of which he was a part. The developments of the twentieth century clearly led to bigger and better killing machines. Orwell saw what men everywhere were doing-"socialist" men, capitalist men, fascist men; he saw that new technologies and centralization made domination ever easier, and he despaired.
The new concepts and new models of our own time throw light on Orwell's concerns in 1984, so that today we can both appreciate his responsiveness to the alarming trends in society and understand his inability to see a solution to the conditions of life implicit in a sexually polarized culture that regards masculine destructive patterns as facts of nature. Given this situation, despair was an appropriate response. Orwell's uncritical acceptance of a conventional misogyny and his tendency to trivialize feminism are among his most serious shortcomings as a moral witness to his times. But they explain his despair. Clinging to an inherently dangerous and presumably inescapable notion of the masculine, yet aware of its deadly potentiality, Orwell could see no way out. He could not name the problem, but in his own manner he followed through. In the end Orwell's despair does him honor.10 Much of the pioneering work on social roles in game situations has been done by Goffman; see esp. his chapter "Fun in Games." There is an interesting but so far insufficient literature on sex differences in game playing and decision making. Vinacke, for example, concludes his study on the subject by suggesting that "males are primarily concerned with winning, whereas females are more oriented towards working out an equitable outcome, as satisfactory as possible to all three participants" (359). In studying female pairs involved in negotiations, Kelley concludes that typically at least one member of each pair is reluctant to maintain the "tough, competitive stance" characteristic of male bargainers (92). Stoll and McFarlane examine the ways in which external characteristics (one's real life situation and social role) impinge on game activity. They conclude that the "expression of masculine role behavior [militated] against taking a cooperative stance in the game, even though the game highly rewarded cooperation" (270). Brenner and Vinacke's article on sex and managerial stereotypes also concludes that males are exploitative but that females are accommodative-at least as far as reported behavior is concerned (289). It should not be thought that I am arguing here for the notion of inherent behavioral differences between the sexes. The growing literature on gender roles and on the formation in early childhood of distinctively masculine and feminine modes of behavior supports the view that these behaviors are learned.
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6 This theme appears first in Burmese Days, in which the Burmese men, like all women, are generally not worthy of respect or fear. The apparent dependence of "respect" on fear is something Orwell does not examine. 
